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Abstract

The rapid increase in the Internet's connectivity has lead to proportional increase in the development of Web-based applications. Usage of downloadable content has proved e ective in a number
of emerging applications including electronic commerce, software components on-demand, and collaborative systems. In all these cases, Internet user
agents (like browsers, tuners) are widely used by the
clients to utilize and execute such downloadable content. With this new technology of using downloadable content comes the problem of the downloaded
content obtaining unauthorized access to the client's
resources. In e ect, granting a hostile remote principal the requested access to client's resources may
lead to undesirable consequences. Hence it is important for the browsers to provide a framework such
that the user can ne tune his system according
to his trust relationship with the content authors.
Currently available systems either do not allow the
downloaded content to access any of the local resources or allows all the contents to have the same
privileges. In this paper, we present the design and
implementation of a model that provides resource access control of a ner granularity for an user agent.
Using our model, the client will be able to selectively
grant access to resources based on a trust relationship
with the principal, who has certi ed the authenticity
of the contents.

1 Introduction

The ever-expanding nature of the Internet and
the World Wide Web poses new problems such as
scalability, standard naming scheme, and security.
Nowadays it is becoming increasingly common to
download some active content over the untrusted
Internet and execute it on a client machine. This
downloadable content can be Java [1] applets, Castanet [3] channel's contents or component objects
like JavaBeans [2], and other executables. With the
wide acceptance of object-oriented technology in every aspect of engineering, it is also common to envision all such content on the Web to be objects,

accepting messages and providing the necessary services. Designing a scheme to protect client machines
from hostile applets and components has become a
necessity. Such a scheme should also provide the
user the ability to selectively allow trusted contents
to be downloaded and executed.
Protecting the client machine from hostile applets can be considered equivalent to providing a
controlled access to a (client) system's resources.
Devising such scheme calls for de ning whom the
client trusts, to identify the source of such downloadable content, verifying that the principal certifying the content (identity) is the same as it claims
to be. This scheme should be exible enough for
the user to customize it to his security needs. The
exibility is now a requirement given the classi cations of the network as Internet, corporate Intranet
and Extranet (a domain consisting of an Intranet
and multiple trusted client sub-domains). As more
Intranet applications are developed it is common to
assume that all such applications and downloadable
content originating within the Intranet domain can
be equally trusted. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of such a scheme for usage
in user agents like browsers such that the restriction
of access to resources in the name of high-security
does not prohibit the users from using downloadable
contents such as applets.
1.1 Motivation
The Internet has proved to be an e ective data
distribution medium, especially for software. The
concept of downloadable content, where the software component (or the software itself) can be downloaded on-demand from the provider's (server) machine and executed on client machine, adds a avor
to this medium. From the point of view of software distributors, a new version of the software can
just be installed on a server from where a client
can download it or, in the case of Castanet [3], the
tuner will automatically download updates in channels from transmitters. At the same time, a client
can be assured of obtaining the latest version. The
important aspect that a ects such a developer-client

relationship over such an open medium like Internet
is the varying trust relationships between any such
pair. One way to protect client's resources is to prevent any (and all) downloadable content from accessing any of the client's resources. This is exactly
the default policy enforced by the Java runtime to
protect client machine from being attacked by all applets, the so called \sandbox security model." The
user-agents (like browsers, tuners, etc.) incharge of
downloading the content over the net and executing
it on the client machine, widely adopt this default
policy and hence restrict any applet from accessing
the client's resources. Though this provides a solution for preventing hostile applets from attacking a
client machine, its in exibility prohibits the client
to grant access to trusted applets. Hence, there is a
high demand for a exible mechanism for user agents
(browsers) to serve the entire spectrum of trust relationship, varying from completely trusted Intranet
contents to highly-untrusted Internet contents. Such
a demand has been the motivation behind the modeling of the exible system described in this paper.
1.2 Infrastructure
Our model is general enough to be applied to
any environment of user agents and downloadable
contents. Our implementation is tailored to the Java
environment, as it is becoming the de facto standard
for deploying Web-based applications. The basic infrastructure over which our system is built is the security framework of the JavaSoft's JDK1.1 release.
We have taken advantage of digitally signed applets
(which establishes an identity to base our trust on),
the public-key key cryptography based mechanism
for such exchange of contents, and the ACL (Access
Control List) framework to associate a list of trusted
identities with any object the client is trying to protect and Java's Sandbox security model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes related work. An overview of the
Java's sandbox security model is provided in Section
3. De nition of the components in our model is provided in Section 4. The speci cation details (identities, groups) required in our model is covered in
Section 5. Description of our access control model
is in section 6 followed by details of our trust policy over which we base our decision and the way in
which we specify such policy, in section 7. Section 8
concludes this paper.

2 Related Work

Netscape Navigator 3.01 prohibits any applet
downloaded over a network from accessing local les.
Only those applets that reside on client machine

which are accessible through the CLASSPATH (i.e.
the content server is the client itself) can access the
local les. The applets loaded over a network can
reestablish network connections to only the site from
which they were downloaded. Any other network
connection to other sites is prohibited. This in exible mechanism does not provide a way for users to
ne tune their browser to allow trusted applets to
access the local resources.
The HotJava1.0prebeta1 web browser provides
a little exibility to users in controlling accesses to
local les. HotJava has encapsulated many parameters as properties (< name; value > pairs) that can
be con gured by the user. These properties take effect when the browser is rst invoked and changes
to certain properties will be dynamically absorbed.
Among those, properties of interest are the acl.read
and acl.write. The value these properties take is a
list of le (or directory) names. Specifying le (or
directory) names indicate to the system that any
applet run by the browser can read the les (or directories) listed in the acl.read and write to those
listed under acl.write property. This means, either
all applets read/write to a le/directory or none of
the applets can.
Safe Tcl [4] consists of two interpreters: trusted
interpreter and untrusted interpreter. The trusted
interpreter provides access to the client machine's
resources whereas the access is prohibited in the untrusted interpreter. The idea behind the SafeTcl is
to run trusted code in trusted interpreter and untrusted one in the other. It lacks authentication and
so all content is to be assumed to have been downloaded from untrusted sources.
The Telescript engine [5] uses credentials and
permits for access control. The credentials establishes the identity of the principal responsible for
the creation of the downloadable content. The permit is like a capability which grants access rights to
other (including downloading client) principal's resources whereas the client can deny the right granted
by the permit. Also permits do not have the scope
of resource restrictions that we provide.
Cryptolopes (cryptographic envelopes) [6] provide a mechanism for protecting the content from
hostile hosts. The client negotiates to access the
content with the server. It helps providing security
to the content whereas our system protects the client
from the content.
Abadi et al. [7] present a calculus for access
control from logical perspective. They have provided
a logical language for access control lists and theories for making decisions on granting access requests.
They have dealt with roles, by treating roles as a

composite principal which acts \as" the role (usually with reduced rights). In our system, we have
not dealt with roles at this point. We plan to work
on these extensions in future.
Jaeger et al. [10] describe an architecture for
access control of downloaded content. Their architecture allows access of resources by downloaded
content in a controlled manner. They map a remote
principal to a principal group and determine the access rights. The four categories of principals they
consider are: downloading principals, remote principals, applications developers and system administrator. Individual principals are aggregated into a
principal group if they have the same rights. Such
group rights are used to determine the rights of each
individual principal. In our design, we de ne access to a resource using an ACL. This ACL is a
set of < principal; permissions > pairs. Thus in
our method, same ACL can be used to de ne access rights for other resources. This increases the
exibility and reusability of ACL de nitions.

3 Java Security Model

The implementation of our access control
model is for a Java-enabled user agent like HotJava. Understanding the underlying security model
is necessary to successfully augment advanced security features. As we are concerned with the security
of a client system's resources against a downloaded
content (applets), we will describe the Java's sandbox security model on which our implementation is
based.
3.1 Security Reference Model Speci cations
The Java Security Reference Model [13] de nes
an applet to be an executable Java program that
is downloaded from the server. Also, applet loading and security is under the control of the application. Hence, de ning our security policy for the
browser is needed to provide necessary security enhancements as far as downloaded applets are concerned. The model de nes a set of security interactions between Java components namely applet, application, Java virtual machine (JVM), client-server
platforms and the server itself. Among those interactions, the Applet Access Device Attempt(AADA)
is important to our model. According to AADA, an
applet may attempt to call a method within the application (browser), such as an access to the local
le system, or display. The application's Security
Manager policy mediates the requested access. The
invariant in the AADA is that the application always calls the Security Manager object to see if the
requested access is permitted. This model (the sand-

box model) in which access to resources goes through
a security manager object of the application, helps
to run untrusted code in a trusted environment and
still ensure that the applet cannot damage the local
machine.
3.2 Sandbox Security Model
Users can import and run applets from the
Web or an intranet without damaging the client machine. Such an applet's actions are restricted to
the "sandbox", which is an area dedicated by the
browser to that applet. The applet cannot access
any resources beyond the sandbox. This helps users
ro run any (even untrusted) code and still ensure
protection of their resources from attacks. The scope
of such a sandbox is left to be de ned by the browser.
Our work presents a model to expand this sandbox
to an extent user desires i.e., user should be able to
de ne the scope of this sandbox depending upon the
remote principals certifying downloadable contents.
According to the sandbox model, a security
manager object serves as an access-approving authority within the application. Any attempts to access to resources, go through the security manager
which in turn grants or denies access. The security
manager is an object that is a subclass of the class
SecurityManager. When an access is denied, the security manager throws a security exception.
Currently, the existing browsers don't have the
exibility to selectively allow access to selected applets. Our work lls this gap by de ning a model
to specify trust, resources that can be accessed on
a per-applet basis, and necessary extension of the
SecurityManager class to achieve the desired exibility.
3.3 Establishing Trust
A mechanism to authenticate applets is necessary to de ne trust based on where the applet comes
from. Digital signatures [11, 12] based on public-key
cryptosystems come to the rescue. If an applet author can sign his applet, then the client can verify
his signature and take necessary action: either deny
or allow resource access requests. The JDK provides
necessary framework for signing class les. To sign
an applet, the author can bundle all Java code (class
les) into a single Java archive le called a JAR le.
Based on his private key and the contents of the JAR
le, the author generates a digital signature block.
On the client side, the security manager can resolve
authentication issues by using the digital signature
mechanism. Once the code is authenticated, then
it can take the right decision based on user's access
control speci cation.

Java provides the sandbox security model
along with the mechanism for authentication using
digital signatures. Our design is based on these
available facilities in the Java security framework.
In the next subsequent sections we will describe how
we use this framework to help user specify trust, resource access control and how these speci cations
are interpreted by our security manager in e ectively
controlling access to the resources.

4 Model Components

Protecting client machines from malicious
downloadable content is the objective of our system.
Before we model a system that would achieve this,
we need to de ne what we are trying to protect (resources) and from whom (principals certifying the
contents). In this section we will de ne the granularity of such resources and varied categories of principals.
4.1 Resources
The resources on the client machine that need
to be protected includes from les, directories on local disk, network connections, CPU usage, memory
usage and access to the display. The resources can
also be extended to non-physical components like remote objects, components like Java beans, etc. In
our implementation, we will illustrate the protection of les and restricting network connections from
Java applets. E ective application of remote objects
[9, 8] may involve method invocations by downloadable content on objects residing in a client machine.
In such cases, the user might be interested in protecting the object from being invoked or accessed by
other hostile objects/applets.
4.2 Principals
When the issue of access control is raised, along
with that comes the question of whom to trust. Implicitly there is an association of contents to some
principal responsible for (creation or certi cation by
digitally signing) that content. Such a principal can
be another user, a company, a host, or a group of
such entities. In an open distributed environment
like the Internet, it is not impossible to impersonate
other principals. This will lead to the user giving
access to his resources to a principal, who is actually not whom he claims to be. Strong authentication is necessary in such an environment. The basic
requirement for authentication is to de ne who principals are and how they can be authenticated.
In our model, principals can be individual
users, companies, or hosts. With each of these principals, there should be a < public; private > key

pair associated. Using public key crypto techniques
we can authenticate the principal. The notion of a
principal can further be extended to groups of such
principals. Assuming the existence of a name space
to resolve identities of these principals, we can conrm their identities. Those principals can establish
their identity along with the content they have developed, by signing them using digital signatures. We
will describe the syntactic speci cation of resources
and principals, as in our model, in the next section.

5 Speci cation of Principals

A standard format is required to specify principals and resources in any of the con guration les.
Resources need to be speci ed only when its corresponding access control list (ACL) is con gured.
An ACL is a list of < principal; permissions >
pairs. Hence, principals need to be speci ed during
formation of ACLs. Principals in an ACL can be
individual users, hosts or group of these. Individual principals can be speci ed using their associated
names (eg., Nataraj, syrResearch, SyrUniv or diamondsTeam for identities and ratnam.cat.syr.edu or
cat.syr.edu for host name or domain name speci cation). Identity names are unique (we assume the
existence of a global name space) and can be speci ed as such. Hence, a identity name can be name
of individual identity like Nataraj or an identity of
a team like syrResearch or a company or a body of
companies and so on. In these cases, even though
an identity might be a collection of other individual
entities, it by itself is considered an identity. This
notion of an entity representing a set of identities
is di erent from groups of identities. A group is
a set of identities sharing some common property.
Each of those identities are called members of that
group. A member can represent a group by signing for the group. But in the above case like researchTeam, though its a set of individual identities,
it is a principal by itself having its own key pair. For
such principals, other authorized principals can sign
as the group.
Groups are sets of principals. Principals can be
identities, hosts or other groups. Groups are specied separately in our system. They are speci ed in
the format
<groupName>=<identityName>[,<identityName>]*

hence, following is an example of valid group specication:
syrResearch=Nataraj,Doug,Paul
diamondsTeam=Gary,Doug,Nataraj
syrHosts=cat.syr.edu,ece.syr.edu
catHosts=ratnam.cat.syr.edu,lynx.cat.syr.edu

The underlying ACLParser object (an instance
of the sun.hotjava.security.ACLParser, responsible for parsing the ACLs speci ed in the predetermined format) parses this information and
populates the ACLManager (an instance of the
sun.hotjava.security.ACLManager, which maintains
ACLs, policy database and the decision making authority for granting access). This is stored e ectively
like a lookup table as illustrated in Table 1. Any of
the speci ed principals in an ACL should be registered in the user's identity database. An identity DB
is created using the javakey utility of the JDK1.1.
This utility helps specify the identity and how it is
trusted and so on. This utility manages a database
of entities (people, companies, etc.) and their keys
(public and private) and certi cates. This tool also
generates signatures for JAR les and veri es those
signatures [14]. It can be used by a client to declare
whether or not it trusts certain entities.
The principals can also be speci ed using regular expressions. Hence, the following is also a valid
speci cation.
allSyrHosts=*.syr.edu

Using a combination of regular expressions and other
groups, new groups can be formed with ease. This
makes the speci cation of principal groups easier.

6 ACL-based Model

Our model is based on associating access control list (ACL) with resources. We create named
ACLs and associate them with resources. An ACL
is associated with each resource to guard it and ACL
itself is independent of the resource it guards. So a
< resource; ACL > pair means that the principals
have the corresponding permissions on the resource.
An ACL can be (re)used to guard more than one
resource. The relationship between resources and
ACLs are depicted in Figure 1. In this design, the
key is the resource name. When a principal tries
to access a resource, the system consults the conguration and obtains the ACL associated with the
resource. It then checks the ACL to see if the principal under consideration has the required permission.
If so, the system allows the principal to access the
resource. Otherwise, it denies the attempted access.
In this system, the Java VM traps any access
to the system's resources. The request is funneled
through the security manager. The security manager is responsible for checking if the access is authorized by the user. The < resource; ACL > association is formed during the start up of the application
(which is executing downloaded content) and hence,
its basically an associative lookup for ACL during

the runtime. The user is also given the exibility
to add new < resource; ACL > entries at runtime.
The con guration is then dynamically updated and
so is the database.

7 Trust Policy

In this section, we will describe the semantics
of the decision to grant/deny access based on the
speci cation of ACLs and policy. We will rst understand the logic behind decisions taken by the security manager. We will then provide the format
speci cation of ACLs and policies.
7.1 Access Granting Policy
Each user maintains a local security database
containing the trust policy information. It consists
of
 a database of principals (and keys) created using the javakey utility
 a speci cation of groups, formed by a set of
principals
 a set of access control lists, containing <
principal; permissions > pairs
 a list of < resource; ACL > (policy) pairs de ning the trust relationship
The speci cation of the ACLs and associating resources with ACLs together form the trust policy
database. When a request for an access to a resource
is submitted, the application consults (through our
enhanced security manager) this database to make
a decision based on the ACL guarding the resource.
The Figure 2 depicts the decision ow in granting permission for a downloaded content to access
a resource. The default policy is to deny any access unless the user explicitly grants access. If the
identity is given access or denied access through explicit speci cation by the author, then the decision
is based on that speci cation only. If there is no
explicit individual speci cation of permission, the
same check is carried out for all of the groups that
the identity is a member of. Even if one of the
groups is explicitly denied access, then the principal is denied access by the security manager. If all
the groups are explicitly given access, then the principal is granted the request to access the resource. If
no explicit permission is speci ed either as an individual identity or as a member of any of the group,
then by default the access is denied. The browser
then dynamically queries the user if he would like
to allow the principal who has signed the applet to
access the resource. Depending on user's input, the
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Principals

Principal
Type
syrResearch
Nataraj, Doug, Paul
Identities
diamondsTeam
Gary,Doug,Nataraj
Identities
syrHosts
cat.syr.edu, ece.syr.edu
Hosts
catHosts
ratnam.cat.syr.edu,lynx.cat.syr.edu Hosts
Table 1: A Group Table
RESOURCES

ACLs

fileDirAcl

displayDiskAcl

guards relation

Figure 1: Sample Relation between Resources and ACLs
database as well as the runtime are dynamically updated. It is also possible for the user to specify negative permissions. This exibility will be useful when
specifying exceptions to group access permissions.
For example, user might want to give access to all
the members of a group except one member. In such
a case, instead of forming a new group (a subgroup
of original group), it is easier to grant permissions
to the group and specify the member to be an exception. All combinations of principals can thus be
accommodated in permission speci cation using the
exible format. The speci cation format for ACL
and policy are given below.
7.2 ACL and Policy: Speci cation Format
An ACL relates principal to permissions. We
use the ACL framework in JDK1.1 [14]. The principal is the key eld in the ACL database. Given a
principal name, one can obtain all the permissions
associated with the principal. The format is as fol-

lows:
[+/-]{User|Group}.{Identity|Host}.
<PrincipalName>=<setOfPermissions>

where,
the rst eld (optional) speci es whether the ACL
speci es a granted permission or an exception. A
, in that eld indicates that it is an exception, i.e.
the principal of given PrincipalName is explicitly denied the speci ed setOfPermissions. A + in the rst
eld (or even if nothing is speci ed in that optional
eld) indicates that the principal is given the speci ed set of permissions. The key word User, in the
second eld, speci es that the principal name associated in this ACL is an individual principal whereas
the keyword Group speci es that the principal name
is actually the name of a group of principals. This
resolves the PrincipalName speci ed in the fourth
eld to be either an individual principal or a group.
The third eld indicates that the speci ed principal

Download the
content

Does it
pass the check?

Perform integrity
check

Discard the
content

NO

YES

Verify their
signatures

Get list of Principals
who signed the content

Execute content

Continue
execution

Grant access

NO

Does it request
access to local
resource?

YES

YES

Consult policy database

Does
the principal
have
permission?
Update policy
database

NO

YES

Alert user

Does
user give
permission?
NO

Take action

Figure 2: Decision ow for access control
is an Identity (name of a person, company, team,
etc) or a Host (hostname, domainname, etc). The
setOfPermissions is a list of permissions separated
by a ','. Following example is a valid ACL speci cation.
+User.Identity.SyrUniv=FileRead, FileWrite
+Group.Host.catHosts=FileRead, FileWrite
-User.Host.ratnam.cat.syr.edu=FileWrite

In the above ACL (say it is named acl1), the
principal SyrUniv has the FileRead and FileWrite
permissions granted to it. All the host principals
in syrHosts have the permission to FileRead and
FileWrite except for the individual host cat.syr.edu
(presumably a member of syrHosts group), which
has been denied FileWrite permission. So e ectively,
the host cat.syr.edu has the permission FileRead
through its membership in the syrHosts group but
does not have the permission FileWrite even though
all the other group members have the permission.
For instance let the policy speci cation contain
/hostA/users/nataraj/javaWork/*=acl1

In this case, the ACL named acl1 guards the
directory /hostA/users/nataraj/javaWork. So contents certi ed by SyrUniv can read and write to that

directory. Also all the syrHosts can read and write
to that directory with the exception of the host, ratnam.cat.syr.edu which cannot write to it.

8 Implementation Status

We have implemented our model for the HotJava browser. The browser allows selective access
control of resources by the user. The user interface
has been designed so that an end-user need not deal
with the ACL or policy speci cation format details.
The user can use the interface to specify the group
and access con guration. The internal format and
storage details are taken care of by our system.
We
have
built
a
security manager class BrowserSecurityManager which
subclasses sun.applet.AppletSecurity. An instance
of the BrowserSecurityManager is created when the
browser is initialized. This security manager object
has an ACLManager object which acts as an interface to the ACLs and the policy database. Whenever
an access is attempted, the sandbox security model
funnels the request to our security manager object.
This object consults the ACLManager object to see
if the remote principal (responsible for the applet
which originates the access request) has the necessary permission(s) to perform the operation. On re-

Principals

Principal
Permissions
Permission
Type
Type
SyrUniv
Identity FileRead, FileWrite
Grant
syrHosts
Hosts
FileRead, FileWrite
Grant
ratnam.cat.syr.edu Hosts
FileWrite
Deny
Table 2: An ACL declaration
ceiving a grant message from the ACLManager object, the access is permitted. A security exception is
thrown, otherwise.
The group and access con guration of the
client system are read during initialization of the
ACLManager object. With the assistance of
ACLParser, the group speci cation and access specication are read and the ACLManager object is populated with this information.
We
have
provided
implementations of the java.security.acl.Permission,
java.security.acl.AclEntry and java.security.acl.Acl
interfaces to serve our purpose. The BrowserAclImpl is responsible for both adding ACL entries
(after reading the policy database) and for checking
permissions during runtime. The class relationship
is depicted in Figure 3 (for clarity, we have omitted
method names from the class diagram).
The interface to the policy database is provided through the ACLManager object. In turn, the
ACLParser object has the permission to read the
policy database. The BrowserAclImpl object can
add new entries at runtime (if the user wishes to
add a trusted principal) and can update the policy
database. Thus all these objects co-operate to control an access to client's resources. Currently, we
have implemented our system to provide access control for the HotJava browser based on who has certi ed (signed) the applet and/or the source host of
the applet (the host from where the applet is downloaded). In future, we plan to extend the communication through the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and
to provide exible delegation mechanism, once the
necessary delegation framework is in place.

9 Conclusion

We have presented a model to control the access to resources in an open distributed environment
like the Internet. This model has been designed to
provide advanced security features to user agents like
browsers enabling them to selectively trust and grant
access permissions to principals in such an open environment. This exibility is critical not only for
development of applications for the open untrusted
Internet but for any trusted Intranet. The need for

such a exible security framework still exists. The
public key cryptography techniques have been put
to e ective use in establishing authenticity over the
network. Using our model, we have implemented a
solution for the browsers to download contents over
untrusted network and execute them in a trusted
environment without damaging the client machines.
We have modeled our system with the exibility of dealing with any kind of resource. Especially
this will be useful with the current state of objectoriented technology where distributed objects cooperate to achieve their goal. Systems based on intelligent agents or distributed objects providing di erent
services are being built. These objects may communicate either through remote method invocations
like the RMI package [8] provides or by the another
remote object mechanism proposed by us [9]. Given
the Web's heterogeneous nature and Java's suitable
positioning as an object-oriented platform for the
Internet, extending our model to distributed objects
can be easily done.
In a distributed environment, rights of a principal may be delegated to other principals. Thus the
access control model needs to be extended to accommodate such delegated rights. As more distributed
object-based systems are evolving and with speed in
which Web-based applications are being deployed,
the need for such a framework is necessary to provide a secure environment for remote accesses. In
the future, we plan to develop a practical delegation
model for secure distributed computation over the
Internet.
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